पृष्ठम्:विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धिः.djvu/११३

एतत् पृष्ठम् अपरिष्कृतम् अस्ति

( 94 ) lames coming together cannot beccme capable of walking. Now Maya itself is icxplicable, an impossible category. It could not be r:al in the sense in which Brahman is; because Advaita has no place for a second reality. If unreal, as the Advaitins have to hold it to belike the ropcserpent or shell-silver it must be one imagined by somebody. just as these instances are. Now who is it that imagines it ? The absolute Brahman is incapable of it and there is none else than It, who could imagin it. To say that it has been there always without anybody's imagination and it is unreal is to speek in contradictory terms. If it is unreal it should necessarily be due to miscon. ception on the | part of । some onejust like the stock instances the rope-snake and shell-silver. Any thing that has its existance independent of one's false idea or perception must be a real entity, ever an unreal one, like the rope and shell or the real snakc and sil ver. If Maya is such, then it is the same as San- khya's prakti and nothing else. Old authors on Advaita have said :

  • Jiva and God, difference between these two,

the pure conscience (Brahman the absolute ), Avidya (Maya), the contact between Avidya and Brahman, these six are for us beginning less. ७१ If Avidya or Maya is as beginningless as Brahman and has absolute co-existance with it, is it not to be considered as real as Brahman ? What is there to