पृष्ठम्:विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धिः.djvu/६६

( 47 ) of clay cannot serve. All these productions are nothing but that original clay. So the comprehension of the clay is the comprehension of all these things. The substance of every thing made of the clay is covered by the comprehension of the clay, though the farm and name it takes later were not existing then and therefore cannot be the object of that comprehension. The other two instances are gold and iron Uddalaka concluded his reply saying Like there 1s that Commander. When Uddalaka mentioned the commander as one to know whem is to know all. Sveta. ketu c•uld not understand, because the question at once arose within him "How can knowledge of one thing be krpy«dge of anything else, not to speak of knowledge of all.” The examples cited by his father suggested the proper and convincing answer to the question. The effects are not separate and distinct from their material cause. They are identical with it. The same substance in a state is the cause and in another the effects. In the former it is one and not many with diferent narres. But in the latter it becomes many with different forms and names. The substance is the same though undergoing certain changes to become fit to be called effects. There are certain philosophers who hold the view called asct-karya-adc, according to which the material cause and its effects, i.e., the thing made of it are separate substances ; there is no identity letween them. Rejecting this view as untern able the Vedanta philcsophy accepts the view called Safaurya-code. In a mud-pot we do not see two sepa•