Among the Vedantins, those of the dualistic school (Dvaitinah) maintain what they call their own version of amyathukhyati and contend thatin cases of erroneous experience like Suktirjata- bhrama, the silver which is presented in Marma is non-being out and-out (atyantasat) within the sphere of nacre, though it is real elsewhere, and the chief argument in support of this view is that the sublating cognition (tdhakapatiti), which arises later takes the form-f there was no silver at all here in the past ; it is not here nowand it will never be here in the future " (atra rgjata isit, ast, blhisyati), and it totally denies the existence of silver within the sphere of nacre in the past, the present and the future The Vedantins of the Viistadvaita school adopt the Prabha. kara theory of ८khyati with certain modifications and their version of dhyati is known as ')!00-upprehension cw upprecision of reality (chyatisticalitansetRiyati). Sri Ramanuja and his followers hold that the object of brama is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at alIn the perception of nacre as silver, it is the silver which is included among the component parts of nacre that is seen. They assume that substances which are similar must have some counponent parts in common, that ilver is made up of parts of nacre and parts of silver and is called silver because the constituent parts represented by silver predominate ; that in the constitution of nacrelikewise, the pre . dominating part is represented by nacre and there is a small portion of silver ; and that this small portion of silver it is, that happens to be seen when nacre is seen as silver. Thus according to the school of Sri Ramanuja, a person who errs in cognition really blunders into a subtle truth, which under normal conditions, is missed or ignored.
A critical student of Indian philosophy would find reason to be dissatisfied with every one of these theories of brama. The non existent or non-being (cat) is an absolute zero and cannot be pre. sented in any experiencethough the Madhyamikas insist that we are helpless in the matter and have to recognise the possibility of asat being presented in experience on the strength of experience itself. The Yagacara idealist endeavours to improve upon the nothingistic explanation of the Madhyamikas by saying that con: sciousness comprises its configuration (shara vijayann), and in its externalized formit is presented in itself as its object. But one can easily see that this explanation involves a number of inconsistencies. The Nyaya realist realises that nothing but reality (sat) admits of being presented in experience; he explains that
error consists in confounding one reality with another reality and
Sri Bhaya, PP. 83 to r88 (X.S.P.)-49+6.
