पृष्ठम्:ब्रह्मसिद्धिः (मण्डनमिश्रः).djvu/७१

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INTRODUCTION

Nyaya, the ground of inferring validity, while validity itself consists in the cognition in question cognising a thing as possess. ing an attribute which it really hasIn that the Naiyड़yikas make the ascertainment of the truth of a cognition dependent upon its agreement with its expected workings or, in other words, with the consequences which are expected to arise from it in the experience of the active subject, their view would appear to be closely similar to that of the moderm pragmatist. Howeverthey do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is only a method of ascertaining truth, that this method itself presupposes truth whose nature has to be explained independently of agreement with practical work ings and that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmatic argument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically through inference, the fault of regressus ad in titan would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such difficultiesthe Naiyayikas define truth as consisting in correspondence with reality and thus combine their pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in common with what is known as the correspondence notion of truth in western philosophical iterature. The Nyaya definition of validity (bra stud) makes it clear that truth consists in correspondence with reality. The Naiyayikas also point out that, only in cases where a cognition leads to effort in practical experience or it happens to be progreat, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to ensure unfaltering effort (i$kanpy: rawi; and thaton the first occasion of halting effort (sakapa wram), it is not necessary that the cognition leading to such effort should have been definitely madeout to be valid and it would do if such cognition should not have been definitely ascertained to be inved. It can be easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear of huestha (endless regression) or atmasraya self dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring truth employed by the Naiyayikas. In respect of the question how validity and invalidity are brought about, the Nyaya theory is that they are brought about by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake of convenience, are called gunas (good fe tures) and abias (defects); in other wordsthe Nyaya theorists maintain Maratastue (extrinsicality) in respect of the Atpatti (production) of validity and invalidity of a cognition as well as in respect of their jupti (knowledge). For instance, the validity of a perception is secured by the good feature () consisting in the adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ concerned and its object and its invalidity is the result of defects such as distance and some disease affecting the sense-organ It would be interesting to make here a comparative study of the epistemological theories put forward by other schools of Indian