वेदान्तसारः/द्वितीयाध्यायः/द्वितीयःपादः
द्वितीयाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः
रचनापपत्त्यधिकरणम् १
रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुभानं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १ ॥
दार्वादेरचेतनस्य रथप्रसादादिनिर्माणे 'तज्ज्ञानधिष्ठेितस्य रचनानुपपतेश्च तज्ज्ञाधिष्ठितस्य रचनाप्रवृत्तेश्चानुमानगम्यं प्रधानमचेतनं प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितं न जगत्कारणम् ॥
ADHYAYA II, PADA II
RACANANUPAPATTYADHIKARANA $
1. Racananupapattes'ca nanumanam pravrttes'ca
The Anumana (Pradhana) is not the cause of the creation, etc. of the world, on account of the impossibility of construction and on account of activity.
The construction of chariots, mansions, etc. cannot be accomplished by the non-sentient beings, such as wood etc. without being employed by a person, who knows how to do them. And they could be made when they are employed by the person, who knows how to do them. Hence the Pradhana, that is non-sentient being, that could be proved by the inference only and that is not guided by an intelligent person cannot be the cause of the creation, etc. of the world.
पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत्, तत्रापि ॥ २ ॥
यथा पयोऽम्बु च दध्यादिभावेऽनपेक्षं तद्वत्प्रधानमिति @ चेत्, तत्राप्युक्त एव हेतुः ; तस्यापि पक्षीकृतत्वात् ॥
व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥
प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितत्वानपेक्षत्वे @@ सर्वदा सृष्टिप्रसङ्गाश्च न प्रधानंकारणम्@@@ ॥
2. Payombuvaccet, tatrapi
If it be said like milk or water; there also the intelligent guides.
The milk and the water are not guided by an intelligent person, when they undergo the changes of curds etc. Same is the case with the Pradhana also. The answer is thus-Even in this case the reason of refutation is the same as stated already; because these milk and water also are included in the minor term.
3. Vyatirekanavasthitescanapeksatvaat
And because from the independence of the Pradhana, there would be never the reverse of the creation of the world.
The Pradhana is not the cause of the creation, etc. of the world; otherwise the creation wou1d take place always, as the guidance of the intellegent is not at all required.
@ प्रधानमपोति A 1,Pr.
@@ नपेक्षत्वेन M 1,Pr
अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ॥ ४ ॥
@क्षीरभावे धेनूपभुक्ततृणादिवत् प्रधानमपीति न युक्तं वक्तुम्; प्रनडुहादिष्वदर्शनात् तद्भि प्राज्ञाधिष्ठितम् ॥
पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्, तथापि ॥ ५ ॥
पुरुषः स्वसंनिधानात्प्रधानं प्रवर्तयति; अन्धपङ्गुपुरुषवत्, @@अयश्चायस्कान्ताश्मवदेिति न प्राज्ञापेक्षेति चेत्-न@@a ; तथापि न प्रधान•
4. Anyatraabhaavaacca na trinaadivat
Not like grass, etc.; because it does not happen in other cases.
It is not right to say that the Pradhana is the cause of the creation. etc. of the world in the same way as grass. etc. are capable of being modified as the milk when they are eaten by the cows; because in the case of bulls. etc. such a transformation is not seen. Therefore the moditication of the grass etc. into the milk etc. also is guided by an intelligent agent.
5. Purusasmavaditi cet tathaapi
And if it is said as in the case of the person and the tone; thus also the Pradhaana cannot be the cause of the creation, etc. of the world.
The self, by his presence. directs the Pradhaana to create the world. This is similar to the case of a blind man guided by a lame one. Another instance is the case of a magnetic stone towards which the iron moves. Therefore the
@ क्षीरीभवद्धेनू A 1, Pr.क्षीरभाविधेनू M 2
@@ अश्मवत् added before. A 1, Pr.अयश्च omitted M 2
@@@ na omitted A 1प्रवृत्तिसंभवः,अविकृतत्वात्पुरुषस्य । @पङ्ग्वश्मादेर्मार्गोपदेशदेशान्तरगमनादिः कादाचित्को विकारो ह्यस्ति ॥
अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ६ ॥
गुणानामुत्कर्षापकर्षरूपाङ्गाङ्गिभावाद्धि जगत्प्रवृतिः । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां साम्यावस्थानां तेषां वैषम्यकृताङ्गाङ्गिभावानुपपत्तेश्च न जगदारम्भः ॥
Pradhaana need not be guided by an intelligent self. It is not so. Even then the Pradhaana cannot be the cause of the creation, etc. of the world; because the intelligent person does not undergo any change. The lame man and the magnetic stone undergo the occasional changes by advising the path and moving from one place to another.
6. Angitvaanupapattes'ca
And on account of the impossibility of the prominence with relationship as prominent and subordinate.
The origination of the world results from a certain relation between the three Gunaas as principal and subordinate which depends upon the relative inferiority and superiority. But, as in the Pralaya state, the three Gunaas are in the state of equipoise, none of them is superior or inferior to the others. Hence. the creation, of the world would not take place.
अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ॥ ७ ॥
ज्ञस्य या शक्तिः, तद्वियोगात् । ज्ञातृत्वशक्तिवियोगादित्यर्थः । उक्तप्रकारव्यतिरिक्तप्रकारेण प्रधानानुमितौ च प्रधानस्य ज्ञातृत्वशक्तिवियोगात् रचनानुपपत्यादयो दोषास्तदवस्थाः ॥
अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॥ ८॥
प्रधानाभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रयोजनाभावान्न तदनुमेयम्। पुरुषस्य निर्विकारस्य
7. Anyathaanumitau ca jnaaSaktiviyogaat
And if the inference be made in a different way, the result remains unchanged, on account of the Pradhaana being destitute of the power of knowing.
The expression,' Being destitute of the power of know- ing' means,'Being devoid of the power of an intelligent'. Suppose Pradhaana is inferred by some reasoning different from the one so far refuted by us, even then, as it is devoid of the power of knowing the difficulties such as the impossibility of construction, etc. mentioned in Sutra II.2.1, do firmly stand.
8. Abhyupagamepyarthaabhaavaat
On account of the absence of a purpose, even if it be admitted, it should not be inferred.
This is not to be inferred; because no purpose will be served by considering Pradhaana to be the cause of the
creation, etc. of the world. The intelligent person, who doesप्रधानदर्शनरूपविकारासंभवात् *प्रकृतिधर्माध्यासनेिमित्तभोगस्तद्विवेकानु- संधान्कृतकैवल्यं च न संभवति ॥
विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम् ॥ ९ ॥
पुरुषस्य द्रष्ठृत्वभोक्तृत्वनिर्विकारत्वादिविरुद्धसहस्राभ्युपगमाच्चासमञ्जसं कापिलमतम् ॥
महद्दीर्घाधिक्ररणम् २
**महद्दीर्घवद्वा हृस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॥ १० ॥
not undergo any change, does not transform himself into the forms that the Pradhaana is capable of assuming. Hence, the two things that do not happen are these--(l) the enjoyment of pleasures etc., that is caused by the superimposition of the attributes of the Prakrti on the intelligent person and (2) the release that could be had by distinguishing himself from the Pradhaana.
9. Vipratisedhaaccccasamanjasam
And the whole thing accepted in regard to the Self, is not intelligible on account of the contradiction.
The doctrine of the Kapilas is not intelligible; because of the acceptance of many contradictory terms in the intelligent person, such as the powers of sight, enjoyment, and non-modification, etc.
MAHADDIRGHAADHIKARANA 2
10. Mahaddhirghavad vaa hrasvaparimanadalaabhyaam
And the views of others like the one that accepts
*प्रक्रृतिधर्माध्यासस्तन्निमित्तभोगः M 1, 2.
**महद्दीर्घशब्दाभ्यां त्र्यणुकस्य, ह्रस्वशब्देन द्वयणुकस्य, परिमण्डलशब्देन परमाणोश्च निर्देशः
असमञ्जस॒मेितेि वर्तते* | वाशब्दश्चार्थे । ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्यां भृहद्दीर्घवत्; द्वयणुकपरमाणुभ्यां **त्र्यणुकोत्पत्तिवदन्यच्च तन्मतं सर्वमसञ्जसम् । अवयवाः स्वकीयैः षडूभिः पार्श्वैः: संयुज्यमाना हि पृथुतरमवपविनमारभन्ते | परमाणूनां निरवयवत्वेन पार्श्वानभ्युपगमात् पाश्वांननपेक्ष्य संयुज्यमानाना न ***पृथु तेषांद्रव्यारम्भकत्वसंभव:**** ॥
उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥
the production of big and long from the short and the atom, are untenable.
The word Asamanjasa (untenable) is brought here from the previous Sutra. The word, Vaa (i.e. or) is used in the sense of Ca (i.e. and). Completely unintelligible are the views of that school, which hold the doctrine that the Tryanuka which is big and long is formed from the D'vyanukas (shorts) and Paramaanus (atoms)*****." As a rule the parts, that possess six sides, begin the formation of a bigger object in combination. The atoms have no parts. Hence, they cannot have sides. Things such as atoms, that are brought together without any regard to their sides cannot produce a big object.
{{center|11. Ubhayathaapi na karmaatastadabhaavah)
On both assumptions, motion does not originate in the atoms and thence there is no origination of the world.
* अनुवर्तते M 1, 2.
**द्वयणुकत्र्यणुकोत्पत्तिवत् A 1, Pr, त्र्यणुकद्वयणुकोत्पत्तिवत् M 3,
*** पृथुतर M 2, Pr,
**** द्रव्यारम्भसंभव: M 3
***** According to the Vaisesika system of the philosophy, two paramaanus(atoms alias parimandalas) form a dvyanukaa (dyad) which is Hrasva or short in size. Three DvayaNukaas (dyads) form a Tryanuka (ternary) which is Maha ( big) and Dirgha (long).अणुगताद्यकर्मासंभवात्तत्कृताणुसंयोगाभावः* । क्षेत्रज्ञादृष्टानां विपाकापेक्षत्वेऽपि न तत्कृतकादाचित्काणुगतकर्मसंभवः । अनपेक्षत्वे प्रागप्युत्पादकं स्यात् । **विपाको नाम कश्चिददृष्टगतों धर्मो न ***जायते । कृर्मवेिधिवेलायामेव कालविशेषनियतफलदायेित्वं यस्य कर्मणश्चोदितं, तस्य ****तत्कालागम एव वेिपाकः । अनियतकालविशेषाणां कर्मणां प्रबलकर्मान्तराप्रतिबन्ध एव विपाकः:***** | अदृष्टानि च तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणफलद्रानस्वभावानेि । अतोऽनन्तैरात्मभिर्वेिविंधकालफलदायित्वेनानुष्ठितानामेकदैकरूपविपाको न संभवति | अनुमेयेश्वरासिद्धेस्तदधिष्ठानाच्च न संभवति ॥
It is impossible to accept that first motion can originate in the atoms. Therefore the conjunction of two or more atoms is impossible to accept. Though there may be required the maturIty of the Adrsta (i.e. the unseen principle) in the individual selves, even then, the occasional motion, that is caused by the Adrsta, cannot have its origin in the atoms. Suppose the maturity is not required, then the motion should have been produced in the atoms even before. In fact, maturity is not newly produced as a certain attribute in Adrsta. When regarded as commandments, particular actions yield particular results. Then at that particular time the Individual selves attain that fruit. This is called as a maturation. When no particular time is fixed for such fruits, the maturation is the state of being not obstructed by more powerful deeds. Adrsta has the nature of granting the results, that are dependant upon the nature of the actions. Hence, maturity does not find a fixed place in all the individual selves at the same time; because the various actions grant various results at various times. The Lord can not be proved by the inference. Hence,
* संयोगाभावात् A ;1. ** ्अतः added before M l,
***ज्ञायते Pr. **** तत्तत्कालागमः M 3, Pr.
समवायाभ्युपगमाञ्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ॥ १२ ॥
समवायाभ्युपगमाच्चासमञ्जसम्, समवायस्यापि जातिगुणादेरिवापृथक्सिद्धिहेत्वपेक्षासाम्यादनवस्थितेः । समवायस्य तत्स्वभावकल्पनायां जात्यादेरेव तत्न्याय्यम् ॥
नित्यमेव च भावात् ॥ १३ ॥
समवायस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमे संबन्धिनित्यत्वमन्तरेण तदनुपपत्तेरवयवावयविनोरुभयोर्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादसदेवेदम् ॥
it is impossible to argue that the atoms can create the world under the direction of the Lord.
12.Samavaayaabhyupagamaacca saamyaadanavasthiteh
And because, owing to the acknowledgment of Samavaaya, there results regressus ad infinitum, on account of equality.
The views of the Vaisesikas are also untenable, on account of the acknowledgment of Samavaya; because Samavaya also like the Jati (class) and Guna (qualities), requires something else, to prove the fact of its being inseparably connected. From this there arises the falIac:y of regressus in infinitum. If it is argued that this nature of the Samavaya is such as being connected inseparably without requiring other means to prove it, let the same principle applied with the case of Jati and Guna also.
13. Nityameva ca bhaavaat
And because the part and the whole, would thus be eternal on account of its eternity.
Samavaaya is considered to be eternal. Such a considera-
tion is not possible without that, to which the retationरूपादिमत्वाश्च विपर्यायो दर्शनात्* ॥ १४ ॥
परमाणूनां रूपादिमत्त्वान्नित्यत्वादिविपर्ययश्च, घटादिषु तथा दर्शनात् ॥
उपयथा च दोषात्॥ १५ ॥
अनित्यत्वादेिभयात् **परमाणूनां रूपादेिशून्यत्वे कार्यगुणस्य कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वासिद्धिः*** । तद्भयाद्रूपादिमत्त्वे चानित्यत्वादीष्युभयथा च दोषादसमञ्चसमेव ॥
belongs, being accepted as eternal. Hence both the parts and the whole which is constituted of such parts, happen to be eternal. Hence this Samavaaya does not exist at all.
14. Rupaadimattvaacca viparyayo, darsanaat
And on account of the atoms having colour, etc. the reverse (i.e. non-eternity of atoms) takes place; because it is so observed.
The atoms have colour etc. Hence its characteristics would be other than eternity; because such a principle is observed in regard to the pots, etc.
{{15. Ubhayathaa ca dosaat
And as there are defects in both the cases.
Suppose the atoms have no colour, because otherwise they become non-eternal, then the principle 'The properties of the effect are due to the properties of the cause' will have to be abandoned. If they have colour, they must be non-eternal. Therefore the whole argument is untenable; because faults do arise in both the cases.
* अर्थदर्शनात् A 1. **परमाणूनां omitted A 1, M 1, Pr.,
***असिद्धेः M 1, 2अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ १६ ॥
काणादपक्षे* कस्याप्यंशस्य वेदिकैरपरिग्रहादनुपपन्नत्वाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥
समुदायाधिकरणम् ३
समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तेिः ॥ १७ ॥
अणुहेतुके पृथिव्यादिसमुदाये पृथिव्यादिहेतुके शरीरेन्द्रियादिसमुदाये** च सुगताभ्युपगते तदभ्युपगमप्रकारेणैव समुदायासिद्धिः । क्षणिकत्वं
16. Aparigrahaaccaatyantamanapeksaa
And as it is not accepted, it is altogether dis. regarded.
Any portion of Kaanaadas' system has not been accepted by the followers of the Vedic doctrine. It is also in lack of proof. Therefore, it is altogether to be disregarded.
SAMUDAYADHIKARAA 3
17.Samudaaya ubhayahetukepi tadapraaptih
Even as regards the aggregate effect by its two causes, there is non-establishment of the theory of aggregates.
The Buddhists have accepted thus-'The aggregates of earth, etc. are caused by atoms. The aggregates of body and sense-organs etc. are produced by earth, etc.' The theory of aggregate is not provable by following the same line of their argument. They have definitely accepted the momentariness
हैि तैरभ्युपगम्यते | संहतौ व्याप्रियामाणाः परमाणवः पूथिव्यादयश्च तदानीमेव नष्टाश्चेत्, के समुदायरूपेण संहन्यन्ते ?
इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेत्; न, संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥
अस्थिरे^ स्थिरत्वबुद्धिरूपाविद्याया^^ रागद्वेषादिपरंपरायामन्योन्यकारणत्वात्सर्वमुपपन्नमिति चेत्; न, अविद्यायाः संघातभावानेिमेित्तत्वात् । न हि शुक्तिकादियु रजतादिबुद्धिरूपाविद्यया शुक्तिकादिर्वस्तुतो रजतादि-
of all things. Suppose the atoms and earth, etc., that function in the formation of an aggregate, are destroyed in the second moment of their existence, then, what are those things, that could be collected together in the form of aggregates?
18. Itaretarapratyayatvaadupapannamiti cet ; na,
samghaatabhaavaanimittatvaat
And if it be said that this is to be maintained through successive causality; we say, 'no' ; on account of their not being the causes of aggregation.
If it be said that through the successive causality of nescience, that produces the knowledge of steadiness in unsteady objects, the desire and the aversion etc. all these may be accounted for. It is not so. The nescience cannot be the cause in the formation of aggregates. As regards nescience, where the knowledge of silver is produced in nacre, etc. the nacre, etc. cannot produce the purpose served by the
^ अस्थिरेषु M 3, Pr.
कार्ये करोति । ^अविदुषस्तदानीमेव नष्टत्वादविद्यानिमित्तरागादयोऽपि ; संभवन्ति ॥
उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॥ १९ ॥
उत्तरघटक्षणोत्पत्तौ पूर्वघटक्षणस्य^^ विनष्टत्वेनाभावस्यैवोत्पादकत्वा विशेषेण सर्वदोत्पत्तिश्च स्यात् ॥
असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो^^^ यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॥२०॥
असत उत्पत्तावधेिपतिसहकार्यादीनां ज्ञानहेतुत्वप्रतेिज्ञाविरोधश्च ।
silver. Here, as the person of Avidyaa ceased to exist at that time, there cannot be in him the desire, etc. that are caused by nescience.
19. Uttarotpaade ca purvanirodhaat
And on account of the cessation of the preceding one, on the origination of the subsequent one.
When the pot of the subsequent moment is originated, the pot of the previous moment becomes destroyed. Hence as the negation alone has the character of the cause of origination, the origination can be had at all times.
20. Asati pratijnoparodho yaugapadyamanyathaa
There not being a cause, there results the contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneity will arise.
Suppose it is said that the effect may originate when a
^ अत्र विदुषः M 3, Pr. ^^क्षणस्यापेि Pr.
^^^ प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः M 1 , 2.तस्यापेि स्थित्यभ्युपगमे युगपत् घटद्वयोपलब्धिप्रसक्तिः । अस्थितौ च संप्रयोगज्ञानादेर्यौगपद्यम् ॥
^प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ॥ २१ ॥
निरोधो नेिरन्वयविनाशः । स स्थूलः सूक्ष्मश्च न संभवति ; कपाला-
cause does not exist; then there results the contradiction to the acknowledged principle, namely ' Adhipati cause and Sahakarin cause etc. produce cognition'^^. If the cause exists, then it happens that two pots are perceived at the same time. If the cause does not exist, it would follow that the contact of the sense-organs with the object and the cognition are simultaneous.
21. Pratisamkhyaapratisamkhyaanirodhaa- praatiravicchedaat
There is no possibility of Pratisamkhyaa (gross form) and Apratisamkhyaa^^^ S (subtle form) of the complete destruction, on account of the non-interruption.
'Nirodha' means 'complete destruction'. This does not assume the state of gross or subtle form. Because what
^क्षणिकत्ववादिभिर्मुद्गराभिघाताद्यनन्तरभावितयोपलब्धियोग्यः सदृशसंतानावसान- लक्षणः स्यूलो बिनाशः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः, सदृशसंताने प्रतिक्षणभावी चोपलब्ध्यनर्हः सूक्ष्मो विनाशोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध इति व्यवह्रियते ।
^^The opponents hold the principle that there are four kinds of causes bringing about the origination of a cognition. They are the Adhipati (Sense-organs) Sahakarin (Associate cause, like the light etc.), Aalambana (the object) and Samanantarapratya (the immediately previous knowledge).
^^^Those who maintain the momentariness of all things accept the two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer ete. ; and the other of a subtle kind not capable of being perceived and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is called Pratisamkhyaanirodha and the latter Apratisamkhyaatinirodha.
23
दिभावरूपावस्थाप्राप्तेरेव विनाशशब्दाभिधेयत्वात्; सतो द्रव्यस्याविच्छेदात् ॥
उभयथा च दोषात् ॥ २२ ॥
^उत्पन्नस्य तुच्छतापत्तौ तुच्छादुत्पत्तैौ ^^चाभावादुत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ^^^अभावात्मककार्यापत्तिरूपदोषात्तुच्छत्वासिद्धि: ॥
आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॥ २३ ॥
is denoted by the words, 'destruction of the pot' is 'the assumption of the state of the broken pieces.' Because also the substance, that has an existence, cannot brook an interruption.
22. Ubhayathaa ca dosaat
And on account of the defects presenting themselves in either case.
In the doctrine which accepts that the thing originated is of the nature of nothingness and the thing is originated from that of the nature of nothingness, the following difficulty could not be got over, namely-A thing cannot be produced from the negation and the thing so produced will be of the nature of negation. Hence, nothingness as stated by others can not be established.
23. Akaase caavisesaat
. And in the case of spatial ether also, on account of their being no difference.
^सत: adde¢ before M 1.
^^ च भावादुत्पत्य M 1.
^^^ भावात्मक A 1, M 1, 3,आकाशे च न तुच्छत्वम्, अबाधिंतप्रतीत्यविशेषात् । प्रतीयते ह्याकाशः श्येनादेिपतनदेशत्वेन ॥
अनुस्मृतेश्च ॥ २४ ॥
प्रत्यभिज्ञानाञ्च न क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिः | 'तदेवेदम्' इतेि हैि सामानाधिकरण्येनातीतवर्तमानकालविशिष्टं^ वस्तु 'एकम्' इति प्रतीयते | अस्याश्च सामग्री पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारवतः पुरुषस्येन्द्रियसंप्रयोगः^^ ॥
नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥
And the spatial ether has not the character of nothingness; because there is an unopposed apprehension without any exception. Indeed the spatial ether is apprehended as the space, where the hawk etc. f1y.
24. Anusmrtesca
And on account of the recognition.
Moreover the momentariness is not proved, on account of the recognition. In the recognition 'This is just that' the object is apprehended as being only one; because what is apprehended in the past time is the same as that which is apprehended in the present time due to the expression used in certain grammatical equation. The recognition is due to the contact between the substances and sense-organs of men who had seen previously the substance and possessed the mental impression on it.
25. Nasatodrstatvat
The experience could not be of non-entity; because this is not so observed.
^देशकालविशिष्टं M 2, 3, Pr.
ज्ञानाकारवैचित्र्येण ज्ञाने स्वाकारं समर्प्य ^विनष्टमप्यर्थमनुमिनोतीतेि वादश्च न संभवति, असतो विनष्टस्य धर्मेिणो धर्मसंक्रमणस्यादृष्टत्वात्^^ ।
उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॥ २६ ॥
क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमेऽनुष्ठातुरन्यत्वात् ^^^फलिनः, निष्प्रयत्नानानामपि सर्वार्थसिद्धिः स्यात् ॥
The argument viz. 'The object that has perished after
imparting its own form to the cognition, is inferred through
the reason of such imparted forms of the cognition.' This
argument is not sound, because, it is not so observed. When
a thing perished, and ceased to exist, its attributes are not
seen to attach themselves to a different object.
26. Udaasinaanaamapi caivam siddih
And thus there would be the accomplishment on the part of the non-active people also.
On the theory of universal momentariness, it would happen that one is performer of the action and another is enjoyer of its benefit. Therefore it would folIow that persons without making any efforts, may accomplish all their ends.
^ विनष्टमर्थम् A 1, M 2
^^ एतदनन्तरम् 'ज्ञाने नौलाद्याकार उपलभ्यते । स विनष्टस्यासतोऽर्थस्याकारो भवितुं नार्हति । कुतः? अदृष्टत्वात् ; न खलु थर्मिणि विनष्टे तद्धर्मस्यार्थान्तरे संक्रमणं दृष्टम्' इत्यधिकः पाठः । M 2, 3, Pr
^^^फलिनां Prउपलब्ध्यधिकरणम् ४
नाभावउपलब्धेः ॥ २७ ॥
^ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तार्थाभाववादश्च न संभवति । 'घटमहं जानामेि' इति कर्तुर्ज्ञानकर्मतयार्थस्योपलब्धेर्न तदभावः शक्यते वक्तुम् । पुरुषस्यार्थविशेषव्यवहारानुगुण्यापादकत्वमेव हि ज्ञानस्याकारः ॥
वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २८ ॥
^^करणदोषबाधकप्रत्ययराहित्यरूपवैषम्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवज्जागरितज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वम् ॥
UPALABDHYADHIKARANA 4
27. Naabhaava upalabdheh
Not non-existence; on account of cognition.
The views held by other school i.e., of Yogaacaara, which hold that there are no objects apart from the knowledge, are not correct. What is apprehended in the notion, 'I know the pot', is the thing (pot) that is an object of the knowledge held by the knower. Therefore it is not possible to say that there is no separate thing. The special charactaristic of the cognition is only the capacity of production of the idea in men with reference to particu]ar objects.
28. Vaidharmyaacca na svapnaadivat
And on account of difference of nature, the waking state is not like dream.
The knowledge found in waking state is not of unreal nature like the dream; because there is difference in their
न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ २९ ॥
अर्थशून्यस्य ज्ञानस्य सद्भावो न संभवति, अनुपलब्धेः । स्वाप्नज्ञानस्याप्यर्थवत्तोपपादयिष्यते ॥
सर्वथानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ५
सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३० ॥
सर्वशून्यवादश्च न संभवति | सदिति ^प्रतिज्ञायामसदिति ^^प्रतिज्ञायां च तुच्छता न संभवति, अनुपपत्तेः ; सदसद्वुद्धितच्छब्दादीनां^^^ वस्तुगतान्योन्यविरुद्धभावरूपावस्थाविशेषविषयत्वात् ॥
respective natures. In the waking state there are no defects in the sense-organs and the knowledge is not sublated as false.
29. Na bhaavonupalabdheh
The existence of mere knowledge is not possible, on account of the absence of perception.
The existence of mere cognition, devoid of corresponding objects. is not possible; because such things are nowhere perceived. That even the dream-cognitions refer to the objects will be maintained later on
SARVATHANUPAPATTYADHIKARANA 5
30. Sarvathaanupapattesca
And on account of its improbability in every way.
The view of universal voidness of Madhyamikas is not correct. When the proposition to be proved is either on existence or non-existence, it cannot be nothingness; because it is not so proved. Because the cognitions of existence (i.e.
^याः अ M 1. , ^^ याश्च M 1. , ^^^ तुब्छत्वादीनां M 1.
एकस्मिन्नसंभवाधिकरणम् ६
नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ॥ ३१ ॥
अर्हतो^ मतं न युक्तिमत्, एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि युगपत् सत्त्वासत्त्वनित्यत्वानेित्यत्वभेदाभेदानामसंभवात् | पर्यायरूपाश्च ^^द्रन्यस्यास्तित्वनास्तित्वादिशब्दबुद्धिविषयाः परस्परविरुद्धपैिण्डत्वघटत्वकपालत्वाद्यवस्था युगपन्न संभवन्ति | तथा घटत्वशरावत्वाद्यवस्थाश्च पृथिव्यादेः प्रदेशभेदेन | तथाच द्रव्यस्यानित्यत्वमुत्पत्तिवेिनाशयोगित्वं तद्विपरीतं नेित्यत्वं च नैकस्मिम् समवैति ॥
Sat) and non-existence (i.e. Asat) relate to the positive states of mutually contradictory natures of the objects.
EKASMINNASAMBHAVADHIKARANA 6
31. Naikasminnasambhavaat
Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.
The views of the Arhat or Jina, are not tenable, because it is not possible for an object to assume simultaneously the states of existence and non-existence, permanence and non- permanence, and separateness and non-separateness. It is also impossible to accept that a substance undergoes different states (Paryaayaas) simultaneously, because the states such as lumpness, potness, and the state of broken pieces etc. which are said to be the objects of the cognition of existence and non-existence, are mutually contradictory. The earth, etc. undergo the states of pot, plate, etc. in different parts. It is not possible to apprehend in the same substance, impermanence and its opposing nature namely, permanence, because
एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम् ॥ ३२ ॥
आत्मनः शरीरपरिमाणत्वे बृहतः शरीरादल्पीयसि प्रविशतोऽकार्त्स्न्यम् वेिकलत्वं प्रसज्येत ॥
न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥ ३३ ॥
^तथा संकोचविकासावस्थायोगादपि नाविरोधः, घटादिवद्विकारादेियोगप्रसक्तेः ॥
the former is the object of production and destruction and the latter is on reverse. Therefore these two attributes cannot pertain to a single thing.
32. Evam caatmaakaartsnyam
And thus the non-entireness of the self.
Suppose the self is of the size of the body. When he enters from a big body to the body of a small one, it happens that he does not enter it with his full size but only partly. Then it will happen that the soul is not complete in the smal1 body.
33. Na ca paryaayaadapyavirodho vikaaraadibhyah
Nor also is there non-contradiction from Paryaayaa; on account of change, etc.
Nor it can be said that the contradiction does not arise, as the self assumes a different condition through contraction and dilatation; because this would imply that the soul is the subject to change, like the pot, etc.
अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥ ३४ ॥
अन्त्यस्य मोक्षावस्थापरिंमाणस्यैकरूपावस्थितेः, तस्य स्वाभावेिकत्वे- नात्मतत्परिमाणयोरुभयोर्नेित्यत्वेन ^पूर्वत्राप्यवेिशेषात् विविघदेहपरेिमाणत्वे वैकल्यं स्यादेव ॥
{{center|पशुपत्यधिकरणम् ७}]
पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ॥ ३५ ॥
नेति वर्तते | ^^पशुपतेर्मतमनादरणीयम्, वेदविरुद्धनिमित्तोपादानभेदतद्विरुद्धा चारपरत्वेनासामञ्जस्यात् ॥
34. Antyaavasthitescobhayanityatvaadavis'esha
And on account of the stability of the final size, and the resulting permanency of both, there is no speciality.
'The final size' means 'the size that exists in the state of release'. The self then remains with the same size always which is his natural size. Therefore the self and his size must both be eternal and the soul must be of the same size even in his former stages. Hence it will happen that if the soul is of the size of the various bodies, then he must be imperfect in those bodies.
PASUPATYADHIKARANA 7
35. Patyurasaamanjasyat
The system of the school of Pas'upati must be disregarded on account of its inappropriateness.
The word 'not' continues from the previous Sutra. The view of the school of Pas1upati has to be discarded; because it is objectionable on account of there being
^पूर्वत्रापि बेिशेषः M 2, Pr., ^^पशुपतेर्मतं नादरणीयम् A 1, M 2.
24अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३६ ॥
अनुमेयेश्वराभ्युपगमेन हि ^केवलाघेिष्ठातृत्वमुच्यते | ^^तच्च न संभवति, तथासत्यशरीरस्य प्रधानाधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः, सशरीरत्वे तु ^^^ ^^^^^तच्छरीरोत्पत्त्यनिरूपणात्; सावयवस्य तस्य नित्यत्वे ^^^^^महीमद्दी धरादीनामपि नित्यत्वाविरोघाच्च ॥
करणवचेन्न, भोगादिभ्यः ॥ ३७ ॥
deviations from the principles accepted in the Vedic doctrine. It accepts that the Lord Pas'upati is only the instrumental, cause of the world and not the material cause also. This view is opposed to the principles of the Vedic doctrine. There are also rules of conduct, that are opposed to what are stated in the Vedic texts.
36. Adhisthaanaanupapattes'ca
And on account of the impossibility of agency.
Indeed, in the school that proves the existence of the Lord by inference, it is stated that the Lord is only the agent. This statement is not acceptable. If it were so, it happens that a bodiless Lord cannot be the agent of the Pradhaana. But suppose the Lord has a body; it is nowhere indicated, that His body is generated. Suppose He has limbs, and yet is eternal; then no contradiction arises in accepting the earth, and the mountain etc. as eternal.
37. Karanavaccenna bhogaadibhyah
^केवलाधिष्ठानत्वम् M 2. ^^ तच्च न संमवति omitted Pr.
करणकलेवरााद्यधिष्ठानवदशरीरयैवाधिष्ठानमेितेि चेन्न, पुण्यपापनेिमित्तत्वात्तस्य तत्फलभोगादेिप्रसक्तैः ॥
अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ॥ ३८ ॥
तथा सति क्षेत्रज्ञवदन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता च ॥
^उत्पत्त्यसंभवाधिकरणम् ८
उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ॥ ३९ ॥
If it is said that He is the agent as in the case of the organs; we deny this, because it would end in His enjoyment, etc.
The bodiless Lord is the agent of the Pradhaana as in the case of the individual self that rules the sense-organs and the body. It is not so. The activity of the individual selves with th e rulership over the organs and body is due to the effect of their past good and bad deeds and is for the sake of enjoyment of pleasure and pain. The same thing will happen in the Lord's case also.
38. Antavattvaamasarvajnataa vaa
Finiteness and absence of omniscience.
If the Lord is of the type stated above, He becomes finite and other than omniscient.
UTPATTYASAMBHAVAAVKDHIKARANA 8
39. Utpattyasambhavaat
(The views of the paancharaatra system are untenable) on account of the impossibility of origination.
सांख्यादैिवत्पाञ्चरात्रमपि जीवोत्पत्त्यभिधानात् श्रुतिविरुद्धत्वेन तदसंमवादप्रमाणम् ॥
न च कर्तुः करणम् ॥ ४० ॥
कर्तुर्जीवात् करणं मनश्च श्रुतावुत्पद्यत इति नोच्यते, "एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणेि च' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥
विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेध: ॥
Like the system of the Sdmkhyas the Paancaraatra system also is not authoritative, because in that system it is stated that the individual selves are created. This is opposed to what is stated in the scriptures and hence this is also not possible.
40. Na ca kartuhkaranam
And there is not the origination of the instrument from the agent.
The agent is the individual self.. The instrument is the mind. It is not stated in the scriptures, that the mind is produced from the individual self. The scriptural text is this-- 'From Him, is produced the breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Mund.II-1-3).
41. Vijnaanaadibhaave vaa tadaapratisedhah
Or,^ if they are held to be the Lord, who is knowJedge and the origin, there is no contradiction to that system.
"वासुवात्संकर्षणो नाम जीवः" इत्यादौ संङ्कर्षणादीनां विज्ञानादिरूपवासुदेवत्वे सति, तदभिधायिनः प्रामाण्यानिषेधः^। ^^परब्रह्मभूतवासुदेवस्य श्रुतावपि "अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते" ^^^इतीच्छावतारः श्रूयते | जीवादिशब्दास्तत्तच्छरीरकंसंकर्षणादीनां वाचकाः ॥
विप्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ४२ ॥
तस्मिन्नपेि तन्त्रे--
"व्याप्तिरूपैण संबन्धस्तस्याश्च पुरुषस्य च ।
स ह्यनादिरनन्तश्च परमार्थेन निश्चितः ॥"
Consider the statement- 'From Vasudeva, there originates the individual self, calIed Samkarsana '. Here Samkarsana and others are said to be Vasudeva whose essential characteristic is knowledge, and who is the origin of the world. Then there can be no refutation of the authoritativeness of the doctrine, that set forth this truth. That the Supreme Brahman Vasudeva takes the incarnation on His own wi]], is said in the scriptural text. 'He is unborn ; Yet is born as many' (Tait. Ar. III-13-1). The words, Jiva etc.' denote Samkarsana and others, who are encased in those particular bodies.
42. Vipratisedhaacca
And on account of the refutation.
Even in that system occurs this passage--The connection between her (Prakrti) and the self is in the form of inseparability. The self is known truly to be without beginning
^अप्रतिषेध: A 1, M 1., ^^भूत omittted A l, Pr। ,^^^इति चावतारः M 1,Pr.
इतेि जीवोत्पत्तिप्रतिषेधाच्चाविरोधः श्रुत्या^॥
इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुविरचिते वेदान्तसारे द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य द्वेितीयः पादः
and end. Thus the origination of the individual selves is
refuted in that system. Thus there is no contradiction with
tbe Vedic teaching.
THUS ENDS THE 2ND PADA OF THE 2ND ADHYAAYA.
^श्रुतः Pr.
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